

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. VIII. No. 22.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1805. [PRICE 10D.

"His Majesty never speaks of the departed hero, Nelson, without being visibly affected. When the news of the untimely death of that truly great man reached the royal ears, His Majesty said: *We have lost more than we have gained.* For two days His Majesty dwelt constantly upon the melancholy event; and, since which the King has said little, but expressed much." — *Sun Newspaper*, 22d November, 1805.

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DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

NAVAL VICTORY OFF TRAFALGAR.—

From the London Gazette Extraordinary, dated Admiralty-Office, Nov. 27, 1805.—Copy of a Letter received last Night by the Hon. Capt. Blackwood, from Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the Mediterranean, to William Marsden, Esq. dated Queen, off Cape Trafalgar, Nov. 4, 1805.

SIR,—On the 28th ult. I informed you of the proceedings of the squadron to that time. The weather continuing very bad, the wind blowing from the S. W. the squadron not in a situation of safety, and seeing little prospect of getting the captured ships off the land, and great risk of some of them getting into port, I determined no longer to delay the destroying them, and to get the squadron out of the Deep Bay.—The extraordinary exertion of Capt. Capel, however, saved the French *Swiftsure*; and his ship the *Phœbe*, together with the *Donegal*, Capt. Malcolm, afterwards brought out the *Bahama*. Indeed, nothing can exceed the perseverance of all the officers employed in this service. Capt. Hope rigged, and succeeded in bringing out the *Ildefonso*, all of which will, I hope, have arrived safe at Gibraltar. For the rest, Sir, I enclose you a list of all the enemy's fleet which were in the action, and how they are disposed of, which, I believe, is perfectly correct.—I informed you, in my letter of the 28th, that the remnant of the enemy's fleet came out a second time, to endeavour, in the bad weather, to cut off some of the hulks, when the *Rayo* was dismantled, and fell into our hands: she afterwards parted her cable, went on shore, and was wrecked: The *Indomptable*, one of the same squadron, was also driven on shore, wrecked, and her crew perished.—The *Santa Ana* and *Algeziras* being driven near the shore of Cadiz, got such assistance as has enabled them to get in; but the ruin of their fleet is as complete as could be expected, under the circumstances of fighting them close to their own shore. Had the battle been in the ocean, still fewer would have

escaped. Twenty sail of the line are taken or destroyed; and of those which got in, not more than three are in a repairable state for a length of time.—Rear-Admiral Louis, in the *Canopus*, who had been detached with the *Queen*, *Spencer*, and *Tigre*, to complete the water, &c. of these ships, and to see the convoy in safety a certain distance up the Mediterranean, joined me on the 30th.—In clearing the captured ships of prisoners, I found so many wounded men, that to alleviate human misery as much as was in my power, I sent to the Marquis de Solana, Governor-General of Andalusia, to offer him the wounded to the care of their country, on receipts being given: a proposal which was received with the greatest thankfulness, not only by the governor, but the whole country resounds with expressions of gratitude. Two French frigates were sent out to receive them, with a proper officer to give receipts, bringing with them all the English who had been wrecked in several of the ships, and an offer from the Marquis de Solana of the use of their hospitals for our wounded, pledging the honour of Spain for their being carefully attended.—I have ordered most of the Spanish prisoners to be released; the officers on parole; the men for receipts given, and a condition that they do not serve in war, by sea or land, until exchanged.—By my correspondence with the Marquis, I found that Vice-Admiral D'Alava was not dead, but dangerously wounded, and I wrote to him a letter, claiming him as a prisoner of war: a copy of which I enclose, together with a state of the flag officers of the combined fleet. I am, &c. C. COLLINGWOOD.

A List of the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, in the Action of 21st October, 1805, off Cape Trafalgar, shewing how they are disposed of.

1. Spanish ship, *San Ildefonso*, of 74 guns, Brigadier Don J. de Vargas; sent to Gibraltar.
2. Spanish ship *San Juan Nepomuceno*, of 74 guns, Brigadier Don C. Clarruca; sent to Gibraltar.
3. Spanish ship *Bahama*, of 74 guns, Brigadier Don A. D. Galliano; sent to Gibraltar.
4. French ship *Swiftsure*, of 74 guns, M. Villars

ma r n; sent to Gibraltar. 5. Spanish ship Monarca, of 74 guns, Don J. Arguñosa; wrecked off San Lucar. 6. French ship Fougeux, of 74 guns, M. Beaudouin; wrecked off Trafalgar, all perished and 30 of the Temeraire's men. 7. French ship Indomptable, of 84 guns, M. Hubert; wrecked off Rota, all perished. 8. French ship Bucentaur, of 80 guns, Admiral Villeneuve, Commander in Chief; Captains Prigny and Majendie; wrecked on the Porques, some of the crew saved. 9. Spanish ship San Francisco de Asis, of 74 guns, Don L. de Flores; wrecked near Rota. 10. Spanish ship El Rayo, of 100 guns, Brigadier Don H. Macdonel; wrecked near San Lucar. 11. Spanish ship Neptuno, of 84 guns, Brigadier Don C. Valdes; wrecked between Rota and Catolina. 12. French ship Argonaute, of 74 guns, M. Epron; on shore in the port of Cadiz. 13. French ship Berwick, of 74 guns, M. Camas; wrecked to the northward of San Lucar. 14. French ship Aigle, of 74 guns, M. Courrege; wrecked near Rota.—15. French ship Achille, of 74 guns, M. D'Nieuport; burnt during the action. 16. French ship Intrépide, of 74 guns, M. Infortet; burnt by the Britannia. 17. Spanish ship San Augustin, of 74 guns, Brigadier Don F. X. Cagigal; burnt by the Leviathan.—18. Spanish ship Santissima Trinidad, of 140 guns, Rear-Admiral Don Baltazar H. Cisneros; Brigadier Don F. Uriarte; sunk by the Prince, Neptune, &c. 19. French ship Redoubtable, of 74 guns, M. Lucas; sunk astern of the Swiftsure; Temeraire lost 13, and Swiftsure 5 men. 20. Spanish ship Argonauta, of 80 guns, Don A. Parejo, sunk by the Ajax.—21. Spanish ship Santa Ana, of 112 guns, Vice-Admiral Don I. D'Alava; Captain Don J. de Gardoqui, taken, but got into Cadiz, in the gale, dismasted. 22. French ship Algeziras, of 74 guns, Rear-Admiral Magon (killed); Capt. Bruraro; taken, but got into Cadiz in the gale, dismasted. 23. French ship Pluton, of 74 guns, M. Cosmao; returned to Cadiz, in a sinking state. 24. Spanish ship San Juste, of 74 guns, Don M. Gasten; returned to Cadiz; has a foremast only. 25. Spanish ship San Leandro, of 64 guns, Don J. de Quevedo; returned to Cadiz dismasted. 26. French ship Neptune, of 84 guns, M. Maistrat; returned to Cadiz, and perfect. 27. French ship Heros, of 74 guns, M. Poullain; returned to Cadiz, lower masts in, and Admiral Rossille's flag on board. 28. Spanish ship Principe de Asturias, of 112 guns, Admiral Don F. Gravina; Don Escano, &c.; returned to Cadiz dismasted. 29. Spanish ship Montanaz, of 74 guns, Don F.

Alcedo; returned to Cadiz. 30. French ship Formidable, of 80 guns, Rear-Admiral Dumanoir; hauled to the southward and escaped. 31. French ship Mont Blanc, of 74 guns, M. Le Villegries; hauled to the southward, and escaped. 32. French ship Scipion, of 74 guns, M. Berenger; hauled to the southward, and escaped. 33. French ship Duguay Trouin, of 74 guns, M. Touffet; hauled to the southward, and escaped. N. B. These four ships were captured by Sir R. Strachan on the 4th instant.

ABSTRACT.

At Gibraltar	-	-	-	4
Destroyed	-	-	-	16
In Cadiz, wrecks	-	-	6	9
In Cadiz, serviceable	-	-	3	
Escaped to the southward	-	-	4	
Total				33

A List of the Names and Rank of the Flag Officers of the Combined Fleet of France and Spain, in the Action of the 21st Oct.

Admiral Villeneuve, Commander in Chief; Bucentaure; taken. Admiral Don F. Gravina; Principe de Asturias; escaped, in Cadiz, wounded in the arm.—Vice-Admiral Don I. M. D'Alava; Santa Ana; wounded severely in the head, taken, but was driven into Cadiz in the Santa Ana.—Rear-Admiral Don B. H. Cisneros; Santissima Trinidad; taken.—Rear-Admiral Magon; Algeziras; killed.—Rear-Admiral Dumanoir; Formidable; escaped.

Euryalus, off Cadiz, Oct. 27.

My Lord Marquis,—A great number of Spanish subjects having been wounded in the late action, between the British and the combined fleets of Spain and France, on the 21st inst. humanity, and my desire to alleviate the sufferings of these wounded men, dictate to me to offer to your excellency their enlargement, that they may be taken proper care of in the hospitals on shore, provided your excellency will send boats to convey them, with a proper officer, to give receipts for the number, and acknowledge them in your excellency's answer to this letter, to be prisoners of war, to be exchanged before they serve again. I beg to assure your excellency of my high consideration, and that I am, &c. (Signed) C. COLLINGWOOD. To his Excellency the Marquis de Salana, Captain-General of Andalusia, Governor, &c. Cadiz.

Conditions on which the Spanish wounded Prisoners were released, and sent on Shore to the Hospital.—I, Guillemo Valverde, having been authorised, and empowered, by the Marquis de Solana, Governor-General of Andalusia and of Cadiz, to receive from the English squadron the wounded prisoners,

and such persons as may be necessary to their care, which release, and enlargement of the wounded, &c. is agreed to, on the part of the commander in chief of the British squadron, on the positive condition, that none of the said prisoners shall be employed again, in any public service of the Crown of Spain, either by sea or land, until they are regularly exchanged. Signed on board his Britannic Majesty's ship the *Euryalus*, at sea, the 30th Oct. 1805. (Signed) GUILL DE VALVERDE, Edecan de S. E.

Euryalus, off Cadiz, Oct. 30.

SIR,—It is with great pleasure that I have heard the wound you received in the action is in a hopeful way of recovery, and that your country may still have the benefit of your future service.—But, Sir, you surrendered yourself to me, and it was in consideration only of the state of your wound, that you were not removed into my ship. I could not disturb the repose of a man supposed to be in his last moments; but your sword, the emblem of your service, was delivered to me by your captain, and I expect that you consider yourself a prisoner of war, until you shall be regularly exchanged by cartel. I have the honour to be, &c. C. COLLINGWOOD. To Vice-Admiral Don Ignacio Maria D'Alava. Sent under cover to Admiral Gravina.

An Abstract of the Killed and Wounded on board the respective Ships composing the British Squadron, under the Command of the Right Hon. Vice-Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, in the Action of the 21st of Oct. 1805, off Cape Trafalgar, with the Combined Fleets of France and Spain.

Victory: 4 officers, 3 petty officers, 32 seamen, and 18 marines, killed; 4 officers, 3 petty officers, 59 seamen, and 9 marines, wounded. Total 132.—Royal Sovereign: 3 officers, 2 petty officers, 29 seamen, and 13 marines, killed; 3 officers, 5 petty officers, 70 seamen, and 16 marines, wounded. Total 141.—Britannia: 1 officer, 8 seamen, and 1 marine, killed; 1 officer, 1 petty officer, 33 seamen, and 7 marines, wounded. Total 52.—Temeraire: 3 officers, 1 petty officer, 35 seamen, and 8 marines, killed; 3 officers, 2 petty officers, 59 seamen, and 12 marines, wounded. Total 123.—Prince: None.—Neptune: 10 seamen, killed; 1 petty officer, 30 seamen, and 3 marines, wounded. Total 44.—Dreadnought: 6 seamen, and 1 marine, killed; 1 officer, 2 petty officers, 19 seamen, and 4 marines, wounded. Total 33.—Tonnant: Not received.—Mars: 1 officer, 3 petty officers, 17 seamen, and 8 marines killed; 4 officers, 5 petty officers, 44

seamen, and 16 marines, wounded. Total 98.—Bellerophon: 2 officers, 1 petty officer, 20 seamen, and 4 marines, killed; 2 officers, 4 petty officers, 97 seamen, and 20 marines, wounded. Total 150.—Minotaur: 3 seamen, killed; 1 officer, 1 petty officer, 17 seamen, and 3 marines, wounded. Total 24.—Revenge: 2 petty officers, 18 seamen, and 8 marines, killed; 4 officers, 38 seamen, and 9 marines, wounded. Total 79.—Conqueror: 2 officers, 1 seaman, killed; 2 officers, 7 seamen, wounded. Total 12.—Leviathan: 2 seamen, and 2 marines, killed; 1 petty officer, 17 seamen, and 4 marines, wounded. Total 26.—Ajax: 2 seamen, killed; 9 seamen, wounded. Total 11.

(To be continued.)

NAVAL VICTORY.—*Address of the City of London to his Majesty, on the Victory of the late Lord Nelson over the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, off Cape Trafalgar. Presented Nov. 21, 1805.*

To the King's most Excellent Majesty; The humble, loyal, and dutiful address of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled.—Most Gracious Sovereign,—We, the lord mayor, aldermen, and commons of the City of London, in common council assembled, impressed with the most solemn sense of gratitude to the Almighty Disposer of Events, for his late transcendent goodness to this highly favoured nation, approach the throne, to offer our warmest congratulations to your Majesty, on the recent most glorious and decisive victory obtained over the combined naval force of France and Spain, off Cape Trafalgar, by your Majesty's fleet, under the command of the illustrious and ever-to-be-lamented hero, Lord Viscount Nelson. A victory, which, while it adds to the British archives, in immortal characters, the proudest conflict that ever graced them, mournfully record the fall of the chief, who had, in that moment, attained the summit of splendid achievements.—Far be it, however, from the minds of your Majesty's grateful subjects, to repine at the severe blow which Providence has inflicted; or, while they deplore the loss of distinguished worth, offend the spirit and character of the British name, by forgetting the many obligations they owe to the surviving brave men, whose valour and public spirit will lead them successfully to emulate such heroic deeds, inspired by their loyalty to their beloved King, and their attachment to their native country. Signed, by order of court, HENRY WOODTHORPE.

His Majesty's Answer.

I receive, with peculiar satisfaction, the congratulations of my loyal City of London, on the late glorious and decisive victory, obtained, under the blessing of God, by my fleet, commanded by the late Lord Viscount Nelson, over the combined naval force of France and Spain.—The skill and intrepidity of my officers and seamen were never more conspicuous than on this important occasion.—The loss of the distinguished commander, under whom this great victory has been achieved, I most sincerely and deeply lament. His transcendent and heroic services will, I am persuaded, exist for ever in the recollection of my people, and, whilst they tend to stimulate those who come after him to similar exertions, they will prove a lasting source of strength, security, and glory to my dominions.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

NAVAL VICTORY.—The *value* of the victory of Trafalgar having become a subject of dispute, and it being, in my opinion, a subject of great importance, I think it right to add here, a few observations to those which I have already submitted to the public; and, I am the more anxious to do this, as, it appears, from the passage quoted in my motto, that my opinion, as shortly stated when the intelligence of the victory first reached my ear, perfectly coincides with the opinion expressed by his Majesty, upon the same subject, and exactly at the same time; or, if there be, as a general opinion, any difference, his Majesty's opinion is still less favourable to the consequences of the victory than mine; for, whatever I may have thought, I never have said, that, by the victory of Trafalgar, "we lost more than we gained."—It was in the Register of the 9th instant, that I had first an occasion to mention this victory. "Upon such a subject," said I, referring to the official accounts, "every man's heart will teach him what to think. There need no words; and no words can express what we all ought to feel." I then just cautioned the public against giving way to any great degree of hope, as to the effects that this victory would have with regard to the main object of the war. Upon this the Sun newspaper made the malicious remarks which the reader will find quoted in page 742 of the present volume; in which remarks I am accused of endeavouring to "depress the hopes of the public, and to throw a gloom over our national prospects;" the accuser little imagining, that I should so soon be able to quote from his own columns a passage represent-

ing the King as entertaining an opinion tending "to depress still more the hopes of the public." In the mean while, however, the accusation of the Sun had circulated; and, as appears from a paper called "the Yorkshire and Lancashire Advertiser," published by one Dowson, at Halifax (for a sight of which paper I have to thank some unknown friend), the hireling in London has found one, at least, worthy imitator in the country, who, as the reader will perceive, has, if any odds, surpassed his preceptor. "At a moment," says he, "when the news of the late glorious victory made every eye glisten with exultation, and every heart beat with rapture, I was desirous of knowing how far such feelings could be subverted by party spirit and political prejudice; under this impression I took up the Register of Cobbett; in general I avoid it, because I feel a pain in seeing talent misapplied to the distortion of truth and the excitement of discontent. In this instance, however, curiosity got the better of dislike, and I read over the remarks of this insidious wrangler upon so memorable an event. Bless me! cried I, is it possible that one born on British ground, breathing British air, and enjoying British liberty, can write as this man writes? No participation in the general joy, no congratulations to his delighted countrymen; no stimulating thanks to the brave seamen who are fighting our battles; no tribute of respect to the departed Hero! All is full of the coldest sophistry, every word marks a malignant desire to throw a gloom over our brightening prospects." So said Mrs. Primrose. She, when her husband had some doubts that his daughters would not make their fortunes by a trip to London with a couple of sham ladies of fashion, afterwards proved to be bawds, quarrelled with and abused him for "damping the spirits" of her girls! But, what will this slave say now? Will he now say that "every eye glistened with exultation;" now that he is informed, that the King, so far from exulting, declared, that we had lost more than we had gained by the victory? What will Mr. Dowson of Halifax say now? Why, Mr. Dowson will eat his words, to be sure; though, it would not be very surprising, if he were to say, with the Courier upon a recent occasion, in a case where the minister was concerned, that "the situation in life constituted no small part of the difference, and that, if the conduct of men in high situations were to be subjected to the same rules as men in low situations, the

"government could not be supported!" Who will bet, that the Halifax slave will not openly adopt this sentiment? He must, or he has only this alternative: censure the King's opinion, or acknowledge himself to have been guilty of slander with respect to me.—No: "no congratulations! no stimulating thanks! no tribute of respect to the departed hero!" Very true: there were, in the Register to which he alludes, few words upon the subject: no loud professions: nothing clamorous either of grief or of joy. But, it would, I think, argue a great want of observation to conclude, that, amongst political writers at least, those who are most liberal of their professions are the most sincere in their attachments. The reproaches of these two, and numerous other, shrew-like mercenaries, will naturally recall to the mind of the reader the taunts of GONERIL and REGAN against the poor CORDELIA; and he will, doubtless, wish, with me, that the latter days of JOHN BULL may not resemble those of the ungenerous, the unjust, and stupid old LEAR. Assured, however, he may be, that amongst the men, who will, at last, defend, or lose their lives in endeavouring to defend, England against the arms of France, there will be found none, nay not one, of those who are now endeavouring to turn the battle of Trafalgar into a political victory, and who would sacrifice a thousand Nelsons, if we had them to sacrifice, rather than lose one of the hundreds of places and pensions that they enjoy.—In a Register, subsequent to the one above referred to, the reasons were given for believing, that the recent naval victories would not produce much effect with regard to the main object, and, of course, to the result of the war. Those reasons having remained unopposed by any thing but mere abuse, I need now only refer to them, if, indeed, any one can still entertain a doubt upon the subject; but, I cannot refrain from recurring, for a moment, to the odious, the wicked attempts, that are making by the ministerial writers to render the naval victories subservient to party views; to cause them not to be esteemed at all, except as being, in great part, the work of the ministers, and as being conducive to their retention of their places; and, of course, to lessen, very considerably, the satisfaction which every good man must have felt upon hearing of the triumph of the fleets of his country. "The victories of Lord Nelson and Sir Richard Strachan have dissipated the hopes of coming into power which the Opposition had founded on General Mackin's disaster, and have rendered the party despe-

rate." Thus began a long article in the Courier of the 28th instant; and, thus, according to the evident notions of these writers, battles, whether by land or by sea, are fought merely for the purpose of aiding the ministry to keep their places, and, of course, to keep the Opposition out of place. This writer has, sometimes, been very severe upon persons, whom he has chosen to regard as enemies to the constitution of England; but, if the Opposition, comprising nearly one half of the members of both Houses of Parliament, do really entertain views such as he has here ascribed to them, what can men think of the constitution of England? Be this as it may, however, it is clear that this writer and his fellow-labourers look upon our armies and fleets as being employed for the purpose of keeping the ministry in their places; and, if this notion could be rendered general, I ask the reader what he thinks must be the consequence? If fleets sail, armies march, and subsidies are given, for the perpetuation of the power of the Pitts, the Dundases, the Cannings, and the Old Roses; if this were once the general opinion (and these writers are labouring hard to render it so), how many of the people, and of what description, would rejoice at victories either by land or by sea? There is nothing; there cannot possibly be any thing, much more dangerous than an opinion of this sort. It is, in fact, a repetition of the very essence of PAINE'S doctrine, the great maxims of which were, that men in power derived strength from war; that they employed fleets and armies to fight, not for the security of their respective countries, but for the preservation of their own places and emoluments; and that, the success of a nation's arms, when under such rulers, only tended to rivet its chains. If the people were to adopt these maxims, there must, very soon, be an end to the monarchy; for, it is grossly absurd to suppose, that a whole people would contribute towards supporting, with their persons as well as their money, that which a whole people must hate; and, as to the present, ministerial writers have nothing to do but to render their notion general, in order to prevent any business of spirits from defeats upon the Continent, or any where else.—LORD BARNHAM, as the successor of Lord MELVILLE, and for other reasons too evident to mention, is become an object of great and constant praise with these writers. But good God! what would have been the feelings of the brave Nelson, nay, what ought to be the feelings of every Englishman, at hearing the victory of Trafalgar ascribed, in any degree to this Lord.

"The public," says the *SUN* of the 26th inst. "may rest perfectly assured, that the venerable conductor of our naval affairs has experienced sufficient to *discriminate*, ability abundant to distinguish, and patriotism, independence, impartiality, and honour enough to *select for employment* the brightest ornaments that adorn the British navy. Happily will it mingle, in the history of Lord Barham, with the *many and important services* rendered his country by the greater part of a long life, assiduously spent in its service, that it has fallen to his lot to *preside* at the Board of Admiralty when the greatest victory that ever graced the page of history will be recorded. I could adduce a multitude of instances that have added weight to his lordship's *discrimination*, and marked his impartiality, and that only want opportunity to add glory to his Majesty's arms. At present, Sir, I am, with the most ardent hope that nothing like party-bickerings may tarnish the universal exultation, or lead astray by baser passions the universal sympathy and sorrow that pervades the bosom of every British seaman."—Of this *Lord's* "many and important services" I never before heard; and, though I had long been a very diligent reader of books and papers relating to public affairs, I had, when this man was made a Lord of and put at the head of the Admiralty, never once heard his name pronounced in my life. The discriminating Lord Melville, however, "foond hem oote," and there he is, first Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty. Much good may he do the navy! May *Englishmen* feel what they ought to feel from his filling that office. But, great as may be this man's merits and services in other respects; and well as the English may deserve what they meet with at his hands, I really cannot be so unjust to the memory of Nelson, as to hold my tongue, when I hear his glorious deeds, which were entirely his own, ascribed, in part at least, to Lord Barham, by whom he was *not* even "selected for employment." The *COURIER* of the 20th instant observes, that "it is highly honourable to Lord Barham, whom the factious partizans of Earl St. Vincent called *a superannuated old fool*, that he provided so ample and so excellent a force at Cadiz, with great expedition, and without weakening any other service."—Now, as to calling Lord Barham "a superannuated old fool," I am certain that no such appellation, as descriptive of this Lord, is to be found in any part of the Register. To the best of my recollection, I never had occasion

to speak of him but once before, when, forgetting his name, and not having at hand any Court Kalendar or Office-List wherein to look for it, I called him "the *Old Gentleman* at the Admiralty;" but, I defy the *COURIER* to shew, that I ever called him "a superannuated *old fool*." I knew better; and I can hardly think, that he has ever been called so by the editor of any print in England, great as is the liberty of the press. To say the truth, it is suspected, that there is a sort of schism among the partizans of the different departments of the ministry; and that the *Courier* having taken the side opposite to that of Lord Barham, has chosen this way of satirizing, or rather, of becalling him; for, reading the public prints so diligently as I generally do, I think, I can safely assert, that he has not, since his promotion, been called, in print, at least, "a superannuated old fool," by any one, except the editor of the *Courier*.—To return to the merits of the victory: what had the sending out of ships to Cadiz to do with the gaining of a battle with those ships? Why do not the cannon-founders and powder makers and still more the ship-wrights put in their claim to a share of the merit? And, if there be such great merit in having ordered ships to be sent out under Lord Nelson, what shall we say of the demerit of not having sent out more ships under Sir John Orde? Who was at the head of the Admiralty, when the combined fleet was first formed? Why were there not ships, or something else, to prevent that formation? To prevent that fleet from going to the West Indies? There were no fleets of the enemy that got to sea; there were none of our islands invaded and laid under contribution; there were none of our convoys captured or destroyed; none of these things happened till Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville returned to office; and yet, the moment a victory is gained, though by a commander of Lord St. Vincent's appointing (as Lord Nelson was) they have the modesty to claim the whole, or, at least, more than half, of the merit of that victory.—It has been stated before; but, it cannot be too often repeated, that Lord Nelson was appointed to the chief command of the station, where he finally won the last victory, by Lord St. Vincent, and during the administration of Mr. Addington. As soon as Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt came back again to the helm of state, SIR JOHN ORDE, the senior of Lord Nelson was sent out to take the chief command of this station. Lord Nelson became his inferior; he was, in fact, put *under* him; under Sir John Orde,

the brother of Lord Bolton, which Lord Bolton opposed the petitioners against Lord Melville at Winchester, and particularly that part of the resolutions which expressed an approbation of the conduct of Lord St. Vincent! Yes, Lord Nelson was, by Lord Melville, put under the command of Sir John Orde; and, during the short stay of Sir John Orde upon the station, he must have been extremely active and watchful; for, it is confidently said, that he got nearly, if not quite, *a quarter of a million sterling of prize money*. In fact, 260,000*l.* is the sum mentioned; and, I dare say, if Nelson, poor as he died, were alive now, Sir John Orde would be amongst the last men upon earth who would be an object of his envy. But, however great the merits of Sir John Orde might be in other respects, it was not he that vanquished the combined fleets: it was not the admiral of Lord Melville's, but the admiral of Lord St. Vincent's appointment; and this admiral became possessed of the power to act, and, of course, to win the battle, only because Sir John Orde, thought it, "under all the circumstances of the case," prudent to withdraw from before Cadiz. And yet, the sycophants of the Treasury have the impudence to ascribe to the present ministers the merit of having appointed Lord Nelson!

ADDRESSES TO THE KING.—In consequence of the great naval victory addresses to his Majesty have been agreed upon in several places, and, from the city of London; an address has been presented. It will, together with his Majesty's gracious answer, be found in another part of this sheet. For the purpose of remarking upon these documents this subject has not been introduced; but, for the purpose of pointing out to the public the necessity of some inquiry relative to the fate of the addresses, voted by several counties and cities, relative to the discoveries made in the Tenth Report of the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry. The freeholders of Middlesex, in their meeting held at Hackney, on the 2d of May last, agreed to an address, which, they voted, should be presented to the King by the Sheriffs of the county. But, the then Sheriffs found, previous to the expiration of their office, *no opportunity of presenting the said address*; and, accordingly, when they went out of office, they published the following letter, addressed to the freeholders of the county. "Gentlemen, having, in compliance with your request, undertaken to present to his Majesty the address voted at the County Meeting, held at Hackney, on Thursday the 2d of May last, we think

"it incumbent upon us, as our year of office is now expired, to inform you that we have had no opportunity of presenting the same, and that we have in consequence delivered it over to our successors, together with a copy of the several resolutions passed at the Meeting. (Signed) G. SCHOLEY, and WM. DOMVILLE."—These Sheriffs have been blamed for neglect, and have been rather more than suspected of coldness in the cause of the country; but, certainly, without foundation, as far as the not presenting of the address can be considered as a proof of their disposition; for, they could not, as Sheriffs of Middlesex demand an audience; they could present the address at a *public levee* only; and, *odd as it may seem*, there was *no public levee* from the time the address was agreed to, till the term of the Sheriff's office expired, in the latter end of September! The Westminster address, agreed to about the same time, is in the same predicament. Mr. Fox and the High Bailiff are charged with the presenting of it; but, *no opportunity* has yet been afforded them of fulfilling the intentions and earnest desires of the people of that populous city. Let us hope, that an opportunity *will* be offered them; for, it would be atrocious in the highest degree to suppose, that an address of that sort would be unwelcome to the royal ear. Mr. Fox and the High Bailiff are charged to bear to his Majesty the congratulations of his people of Westminster upon the recent virtuous decision of the House of Commons; to assure him of their unshaken attachment to his person and family; and to express to him their earnest hope, that, in future, great care will be taken to keep speculators and corrupt men of every description far from his councils. Let us hope, that an opportunity will, ere long, be offered for the presenting of this address, and that it will meet with an answer not less gracious than that just given to the address of the city upon the subject of the naval victory; for, I am fully persuaded, that there is no honest and reflecting man who will scruple to say, that the victory of the 8th of April last was as great, nay, much greater, than that of the 21st of October. In their consequences both may possibly, though, I trust, not probably, be useless; but, supposing each to be, first or last, productive of all the national benefits, which, in the unobstructed operation of wisdom and justice, it is calculated to produce; then, I say, that glorious as the victory of Trafalgar unquestionably was, and important as, in the opinion of some persons, its effects must be, it was far, very far indeed, less valuable to the nation, than

was the victory, the hard-won victory, of the 8th of April. The French are our enemies. True: and are peculators our *friends*? The French are our enemies, very dangerous enemies, enemies that we ought be constantly endeavouring, by all the means of lawful war, to conquer or to destroy. Still, the French are *open* enemies. In the bay of Trafalgar we made great havoc amongst those enemies, whom we see coming against us armed for our destruction; but, in the House of Commons we struck the first blow into that nest of harpies, who, in secret, have been so long preying upon, gnawing out, the vitals of the country. By the victory of Trafalgar we acquired a great addition of naval glory, and additional relative means of national defence; but, on the 8th of April, we took the first step that has for many years been taken, towards the preservation of that which renders the country *worth defending*. "I thought," some shallow observer will say, "that our *liberties* were our most precious possession." True; but what, after all, are "our liberties?" *What are they?* and can they possibly be enjoyed while acts are, with impunity committed, such as those, which were censured by the House of Commons, on the 8th of April last? Our constitution, that constitution, for which we are called upon to fight, and for which, I trust, we shall fight as valiantly as our countrymen have recently fought at sea; that constitution provides for a full and faithful account to the people, through the members of parliament, of the expenditure of money raised upon them in taxes, not one farthing of which money ought to be expended unless agreeably to the laws by which the expenditure is authorised. This it is that we are about to fight for; and is it not of vast importance, that we should, down to the lowest of us, be convinced that we *have it to fight for*? The victory, in the House of Commons, on the 8th of April last (including, of course, the natural and necessary *further proceedings*) gave us that conviction. After all the doubts that had been excited, or which designing men had endeavoured, at least, to excite, in our minds, respecting the *efficacy* of our constitution, we rejoiced to find, from this practical application of it, that it was *real*, that it was *efficient*, that it was *unimpaired*. For this reason it is, that I think no man who really loves the country will deny, that the addresses upon the subject of the Tenth Report merited, and still merit, attention as great, and greater, than those upon the subject of the victory of Trafalgar. There has, as yet, been no *public law*, since these ad-

resses were agreed to; and, whatever may have been, and may yet be, *the cause*, every loyal subject of his Majesty must deeply lament that it should have existed. But, we may now reasonably hope, that it will soon cease; and that the expression of our approbation of the conduct of the House of Commons and of that of the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry will find its way to the royal ear as soon, at least, as our congratulations relative to the glorious achievements of the navy.—To these general observations I cannot, upon the subject of the present addresses, refrain from adding a few of a somewhat more particular nature. I have observed, as the reader must, that, from the moment that the naval victory was first announced, there appeared, amongst the partizans of the ministry, an anxious desire, to couple the merits of their patrons with the merits of the commander of the fleet. At the meeting in the Borough of Southwark this desire made its appearance in an attempt of a cast more unequivocal than any that had been before observed. SIR THOMAS TURTON (a Baronet, I believe, and a lawyer) concluded in the following words (according to a report in the *Sun* newspaper of the 22d instant) a speech made introductory to the proposing of an address to the King. "The loss of such a man cannot be supplied; yet we may with reason hope that the splendour of his example will excite that emulation in the British navy, which cannot fail to secure to this country a naval pre-eminence so acknowledged as may bid defiance to all the combined efforts of our present and future enemies, however numerous and powerful; nor in this reflection are we doing injustice to his beloved memory; for could the shade of our departed hero; of that hero whose patriotism was as conspicuous as his gallantry, and which recognised nothing mean or selfish in it; look back on the transient things of this world, it would applaud the patriotic exultations we now express, even at the sacrifice of our personal feelings." (Here the Speaker overcame by his *sensibility* made a *pathetic* pause). "Sir Thomas then added, that he should not trespass longer on their time than merely to observe, that whilst in the address he had avoided every thing which could possibly excite opposition, or prevent an unanimity so particularly desirable on such an occasion, he could not but express to the meeting his individual wish, that the address should contain some sentiment of approbation of his Majesty's government for the able and judicious ad-



"position of the naval force of the country, by which the gallantry of our countrymen had been so successfully called into action." Sir Thomas said, that he should be guided by what appeared to be the sense of the meeting as to this addition, which he was the more desirous of making, because, in the course of the last twelve years, he had so repeatedly witnessed in that place an uniform system of abusing the measures of government; and he thought it but justice, therefore, that while they exercised their undoubted right of complaint, they should not withhold a tribute of approbation where the claim of government to it was equally undoubted."—Sir Thomas has all the Whitehall phrases as pat as if he were already lodged in that quarter of the town. "His Majesty's government," meaning the ministry, is never used by any one who has not well combed over the vocabulary of Downing Street. "His individual wish:" mark that! So that, whether it was carried or not, he was safe: he had done his best. Lord WILLIAM RUSSELL, however, who could not for his life discover any sense or reason in working "His Majesty's government" into the address, objected to it most decidedly; whereupon a man by the name of BOTHAM got up, and said: . . . But, stay: we will take this speech from AN ADVERTISEMENT in the MORNING HERALD newspaper of the 23d instant. Its appearance as an advertisement we will endeavour to account for by-and-by, having first read it with attention. It is a rare and delicate morsel. SURREY MEETING. The most noticed speech at this meeting was that of Mr. BOTHAM: after having apologized to the company, he began by saying, No one could more admire and concur in the address then proposed than himself; but, Sir, says this gentleman, I am overwhelmed with the mournful remembrance of having lost a hero unrivalled in glory and victory, and, I fear, will never be surpassed; but, as this cloud is dispersed by the Sun of British valour, my soul is agitated with joy; and it cannot fail to raise a monument in the breasts, [a pair of them, too, observe] "of every grateful mind. Sir, let the resolutions of this day testify to the best of kings, that it is the unanimity of his subjects under the guidance of the greatest minister that ever lived, that has saved the country, and will rescue Europe from the usurpation of the tyrant of the world, and, I trust, teach him to retire within those boundaries that ought not to have been exceed-

"ed." To comment upon this unparalleled nonsense would be to throw away time and to insult the reader. MR. BOTHAM, of whom I never before heard, is, one would suppose from his style, a tailor, and from the sentiments that he, apparently, would have expressed, had he known how, one would take it that he made cloaths for the army, or served the navy with slops.—This speech was, as was above stated, inserted in the Morning Herald, in the form of an advertisement. It was, doubtless, sent as a paragraph, was paid for, and was, of course, intended to have the appearance of being written by the editor of the paper; but, the editor, unwilling, for reasons too evident to mention, to pass for the author of it, claps it, though at the expence of a three shilling tax, into the middle of a column of advertisements! Such, reader, are the men who regard Mr. Pitt as "the greatest minister that ever lived."—To return, for one moment longer to the Borough: Mr. BOTHAM was followed by a Mr. LOWNDES, who appears to be a politician of much about the same size as Mr. BOTHAM. This man having talked, too, about the great share of merit due to the ministers in having so wisely disposed of our naval force, Mr. PERRY (of the Morning Chronicle, I believe) got up, and, by stating the following interesting fact, put the extinguisher upon all the orators of "His Majesty's Government." He was glad, he said, that the approbation of the ministers was not to be pressed; "because not only should he have been obliged to oppose it, but he could have produced a document, then in his pocket, and which was a letter from Lord Nelson, written a few days previous to the engagement, which would have satisfied every man present, that the disposition of the naval force at that period deserved censure, not praise."—There can be no doubt of the correctness of this statement. No one dared to call upon Mr. PERRY to produce the letter. The fact is very curious, and ought to be borne in mind by all those who happen to be present upon occasions when the ministers, or their partisans, are attempting to raise themselves upon the wings of Lord Nelson.

LLOYD'S FUND.—Upon the origin, and probable evil consequences of the Fund, at Lloyd's Coffee House, for the reward and encouragement of soldiers and sailors, much has been said in several parts of the Register, particularly in the following places: Vol. IV. pp. 111, 281, 353, 415, 448, 471, 476, 607; and in Vol. VI. p. 790. At present we must confine ourselves to the state-

tempt that is now making to stretch the power of these fund-dealers at Lloyd's, and of the fund-dealers in general, even farther than it has hitherto been attempted to be stretched.—The last we heard of the Committee at Lloyd's was, their preparing to give *budges of distinction* to such persons in either the land or sea service as *they* might think worthy of them; and I must beg the reader to refer to the article in p. 790 of Vol. VI. We had before seen them endeavouring to make themselves the *centre of the whole nation*, the collectors of the subscriptions in every part of the kingdom; and, in order to render these subscriptions general, we had seen them (Vol. IV. p. 471, which see by all means) sending, under the franks of Mr. Freeling, Secretary to the General Post Office, a circular letter addressed to the Mayors, or Chief Magistrates, of all the cities, towns, and boroughs of the United Kingdom, calling upon them to open subscriptions, and to use “ALL their influence” in promoting the objects of the Committee at Lloyd's, to whom they were to remit, or cause to be remitted, whatever money they could raise! About the same time, a circular letter was (see Vol. IV. p. 476) sent to the parochial clergy in the diocese of the Bishop of Durham, and as the news-papers stated, by order of the Bishop, requesting them to explain to their respective parishioners the nature and to *recommend* the object of the Fund at Lloyd's; as also to become the *receivers of any subscriptions* that might be paid to them, and to transmit the same to certain banks. Upon the singular fitness of making the magistrates and the clergy tax-gatherers to the Committee at Lloyd's, no remarks need, surely, now be offered! Who, as was then observed; who, amidst all the changes and chances and revolutions in society; who ever expected to see a Bishop and his clergy employed in collecting money to be deposited in the hands of a set of brokers and money-dealers, for the purpose of enabling those brokers and money-dealers to dispense rewards and honours amongst the troops and the seamen, amongst the persons serving in the royal army and navy!—But, now, there is a proposition before the public for going, as to the mode of collection, a step, and a very wide step, further. It is now proposed to call upon the clergy, without any permission of their Bishops, to become at once the collectors for the Committee at Lloyd's, and to make the collections *in their churches too!*—I will here insert the article particularly alluded to, as it stands in the *Times* newspaper of the 26th instant.—“PA-

“PATRIOTIC FUND. It has been observed, that if a general subscription were to take place throughout the British Empire in aid of this truly benevolent and patriotic institution, no less a sum than 100,000*l.* might easily be collected. Such a proposition has been very properly suggested to Mr. Angerstein, as he is always prompt, active and liberal upon every occasion that tends to the honour of his country and the interests of humanity. The 5th of next month has been pointed out as the day most suitable for such a collection to take place, *under the authority of Government*; a day assigned to an act of solemn thanksgiving to the Great Disposer of events, for our recent success under his gracious protection, may indeed be very properly employed in a measure intended to lessen the sufferings of his creatures. The following is the calculation that has been made of the probable amount:

“ Scotland (containing 900 parishes, at from 5 <i>l.</i> to 6 <i>l.</i> each)	-	-	45,000
“ England, twelve times the above	-	-	60,000
“ Ireland, three times ditto	-	-	15,000
“ Volunteers, Army and Navy	-	-	10,000
“ Private Subscriptions	-	-	10,000
			100,000

“ From the foregoing statement, which implies a compliment to the patriotism of the people of Great Britain which they fully deserve, there can be little doubt but the produce would fully equal the calculation. Who would refuse his mite upon so laudable an occasion! The poorest man who feels as a Briton would cheerfully contribute; and every thing should be accepted in support of so noble a cause. The widows and orphans all over the Empire would, by their blessings, consecrate the design, and animate every breast to support it. We trust that the Conductors of the Patriotic Fund, whose zeal, industry, and perseverance have been so strenuously exerted in this generous cause, will attend to this suggestion, and give the sanction of their name and example to it. The first characters in the country, as well as the most humble, and all the intermediate classes, may be confidently expected to give a strenuous aid on so meritorious an occasion, and then, perhaps, it will appear that the above calculation is much below what is the philanthropic character of all the inhabitants of the British Empire will readily contribute for so meritorious a purpose.—We learn with great pleasure, that the inhabitants of one of the most extensive

"parishes in the neighbourhood of London have made application, and obtained permission from the rector, for a collection to be made after divine service on the thanksgiving day, to shew their sympathy with the wounded heroes of Trafalgar, and to put the same under the management of the committee of the patriotic fund. Now this is as it ought to be, and what we strongly recommend."—This proposal, you observe, extends to nothing short of a collection in all the parish churches in the kingdom, to be made by the authority of government, and, when made, the proceeds to be placed at the disposal of the Committee at Lloyd's, a committee of fund-dealers! The proposition is so impudent, that it must, one would hope, meet with general reprobation. Yet, such is the influence of the funding system; so extensive are the means which the persons who depend upon that system have of controlling men in all ranks of life, that it really would not much surprize me, if I were to see the ministers and church-wardens of the kingdom all engaged in this proposed hopeful employment.—"What," will exclaim some hypocrite, "would you bestow no rewards, would you administer no comforts, to the meritorious or unfortunate men who have served their country in so glorious a manner?" Yes; Balaam, I would have the meritorious well rewarded, and the unfortunate comforted; but, the rewards and the means of comfort should pass through the hands of His Majesty. If, indeed, any man, or society of men, have a mind to bestow part of their own property upon the soldiers or the sailors, it is well. They have not only a right so to do; but they ought to be applauded for the act; but, no subject, or set of subjects, ought to be permitted to raise money upon the public, and especially by the hands of the magistrates, the clergy, or other persons in authority, for any purpose of this kind. To do so, is, in fact, a bold step towards supplanting the authority and office of the King.—Who is the Rector that has given permission to make a collection in his church for the Lloyd's Fund? I would fain know his name, and the name of his parish; and then I would enquire whether his principal parishioners, and whether he himself, be not a little addicted to a species of traffic vulgarly called stock-jobbing!—Yes, I would have military (sea as well as land) merit amply rewarded. I would have it highly distinguished. It should have its full share of honours and titles; and, in order to render those titles worth the acceptance of gallant and honourable men, I would, if I could

have my wish, never have them bestowed upon any one who had not distinguished himself by some eminent talents and some great services rendered to the state. They should not be, as it has been asserted they were, but too often in France, bestowed upon men of mere money; men who could afford to give the highest price for them, or who could, either by himself or his kin or dependants, do the job the most agreeably to the minister of the day; for, when such is the case, titles are of little value: they may serve to gratify the vanity of an upstart tradesman, but they must cease to be held in esteem by men of sound and high minds.—I would, too, have the maimed and the worn-out in war comfortably provided for, together with their widows and orphans. I can see no reason why Greenwich Hospital should not be extended, and Chelsea too, seeing that when these establishments were made, our fleet and army were not a tenth part so great as they now are. The Duke of York is said to have been chiefly instrumental in recently obtaining an addition to the allowance of the out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital; and for that he deserves the applause of the army and the country; but, was it not surprising, that while the civil list and all the salaries in all the offices under government had been rising from time to time to four or five times what they were a hundred and fifty years ago, the allowance to the crippled or worn-out soldier should have continued to be in nominal amount, what it was in the reign of King Charles II.? Great praise is also due to Mr. Windham, conjointly, I believe, with the Duke of York, for the establishment of the Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea. These establishments want extending in every direction; but, for the maimed and worn-out sailors there is more pressing need of a comfortable and permanent provision.—But, it is His Majesty that ought to be enabled to make this provision. It is his army, it is his fleet; he orders both to act, both to fight, both to venture limb and life; and, to him most assuredly should belong the power of bestowing rewards upon them, and of doing all the gracious acts which justice and the good of the service require to be done. I lament, therefore, that any portion of this most agreeable and love-inspiring part of the powers of royalty should, from whatever cause, fall into other hands; and, particularly I lament, that it should fall into the hands of a set of dealers in funds, meeting at a coffee-house, notoriously the grand scene of mere mercenary transactions.—When the Committee at Lloyd's first began their

"patriotic" operations, in 1803, I had occasion to remark upon the attacks, made by the advocates for the Lloyd's fund, upon the nobility, the gentry, and the clergy. The first assault of this kind appeared, in the newspapers, in the form of a letter addressed to the Earl of Suffolk. His Lordship had, in his place in parliament, made some very just remarks upon the backwardness of the city of London in raising their quota of men; in revenge for which he was, by this insolent writer, tauntingly invited to add his name to the subscription list, and was, at the same time, reminded, that only three of his order had, as yet, shown a disposition to assist in rewarding "our defenders." Accusations of the same sort frequently appeared, about the same time, and continued to appear for several months, against the nobility, gentry, and clergy (see Vol. IV. p. 281), with the evident intention of bullying them into the subscription. Similar means are now again beginning to be employed; and, as a specimen, I quote the following paragraph from the Morning Herald newspaper of the 27th instant. "At this awful crisis, when every thing valuable to Britons, and consequently to Europe, is at stake.".....Stop! At stake, say you? Let us see: you are a ministerial writer? You are one of those who have been, for some weeks past, representing the victory of Trafalgar as having secured, beyond all doubt, this country, at least, against all attempts of the enemy? You are one of those who abused every man that did not consider that victory as *decisive*; as of decisive importance with respect to the main object, and, of course, the result, of the war. You are one of those who said: "this victory will animate the continental powers, because it will prove to them (a proof we did not want), that we do not entertain any apprehensions for ourselves; that we are secure of victory, whenever the French dare to quit their own shore; and that our exertions against France are less to ensure our safety than to enable the Continent to achieve theirs." When I quoted this passage, only three weeks ago, I begged the reader to mark it well; for that he would have to compare it with what would soon be said by the same writers.—But, as I said then, so I allow now, that they were hypocrites; that their fears told them that the naval victory had made but very little difference in our relative situation; that the danger, the permanent danger, of the country continued to be nearly, if not quite, as great as ever; that, in short, and to take up and adopt their present expression, the crisis is

awful, and, every thing valuable to Britons is at stake.—To proceed now with the quotation: "To what are we to attribute the apathy that reigns in those circles, who vie in the most costly and ruinous competition of extravagance and waste, whilst scarcely a distinguished name appears upon the list of subscribers to the Patriotic Fund, so impressively announced under circumstances of restraint to fulfil the benevolent purposes of its exertion. To what are we to impute this astonishing remissness of humanity, while every eye appears to glisten with the tear for departed heroism in the severe loss of so many of our brave defenders; and when but the solitary name of one peer" (the Duke of QUEENSBURY's is, I see, in the list!) and one member of parliament grace a list of not less than sixty-three individual subscribers, up to the 19th instant: O! shame, where is they blush!" This, and the like of it, is, however, very likely to have the desired effect. We shall now, probably, see great "patriotism" displayed. It will really be worth while to observe who are the men that are capable of being thus bullied out of their money!—Since writing the above, I have perceived, that the Committee at Lloyd's have actually adopted the plan of a parochial subscription, in the churches, and have, accordingly issued their circular letters to the Chief Magistrate, or resident minister, of every city and town throughout the kingdom. But, let us hear the whole of their proclamation; for it is, the reader may be assured, one of those things, to which the future historian will refer as signs of the approach of those awful scenes which it will be his chief object to describe! The reader may be assured of this; and, therefore, the document is worthy of his attention.—

PATRIOTIC FUND. Lloyd's, 26th Nov. 1805. The Committee for managing the Patriotic Fund, in their Address to the public, on occasion of the late signal successes of His Majesty's arms, suggested the idea of collections being made after divine service, on the day appointed for a general thanksgiving, religious congregations of every denomination, for the relief of the widows and orphans of those who fell, and for those who were wounded in contributing to these glorious victories. The Committee are persuaded, that many persons whom it may not suit to give sums for which they would choose to set down their names as individual subscribers, would gladly avail themselves of such an opportunity, when every heart will swell with gratitude for national mercies to unite

“ the parties of patriotism with those of devotion, and contribute according to their means to these meritorious objects. At the present crisis, when one expedition has already sailed for the Continent, when others are expected to follow, and when deeds of daring enterprise on the coast of the enemy are on the eve of execution, it is highly important to animate the spirits of the brave men who fight our battles, by shewing them that British liberality and patriotism rise with the occasions that call them into exercise: that the fund subscribed for their encouragement and relief at the commencement of the war, so far from being exhausted by the demands made upon it by their gallant exertions, is swelled by new contributions of national gratitude to an amount hitherto unprecedented; and that the pledge given by this committee, in the report of their proceedings, will assuredly be fulfilled, that the seaman, the soldier, and the volunteer, may confidently trust that those who were dear to him while living, will, in the event of his falling in the sacred cause, find friends and guardians in a grateful and generous country. The committee have directed letters to be sent to the chief magistrate, or resident minister, in every town and city throughout the kingdom; but, to supply the inaccuracy of the list of their addresses, adopt this mode of soliciting the influence of every individual, in promoting the views, and enlarging the usefulness of this laudable and benevolent institution.”—Thus, then, all the magistrates, all the ministers, and all the parish officers in the kingdom, are put in motion by a Committee at Lloyd's! And for the purpose of enabling that Committee to become the patrons of the army and the navy! Truly, SWIFT and POPE, when they exerted their powers of ridicule against the tenants of Garraway's and the 'Change, little dreamt of times such as these! Things are drawing on fast towards that state so powerfully and so fearfully described by HUME, at the close of his essay upon PUBLIC CREDIT. All endeavours to stop the progress, will, it is to be feared, prove useless. It is in the nature of things, that it should go on; it cannot stop, till it has reached the point where it must end; but, yet, it is our duty to endeavour to arrest it.—If I am told, that, however reasonable my wishes with regard to the extension of the national provision for the meritorious or unfortunate soldiers and sailors may be, still, as no such extension has yet taken place, I ought, in the mean while, to acqui-

esce in the utility of the Lloyd's Fund, as a temporary measure, at least: If I am told this, I answer, that the Fund at Lloyd's has existed now for more than two years; that two sessions of parliament have since gone over our heads; and that, if the provision be proper, it might, long ago, have been made by legal and regular means. If it be objected, that the taxes are already heavy enough, the answer is evident, that the money raised by the Lloyd's men must come out of the pockets of the people, and taxes can come from no other source: a guinea is a guinea, whether paid in at Lloyd's or at the Exchequer.—But, at “a crisis so awful, when every thing valuable to Britons is at stake,” could there be found no way of saving a hundred thousand pounds, (for that, it seems, is the sum wanted) out of the present revenues of the nation? At such a crisis, suppose Mr. Pitt and the Dundases were to hold their hands for a year in the granting of pensions and other emoluments of that description? Last year there was a grant made to the Athol Family, a grant very strongly but very truly described by the Lord Chief Justice, of 3,500*l.* a year, for ever. The worth of this grant is about 100,000*l.* It would, in all probability, sell for so much at Lloyd's. The property and labour of the country are pledged for so much. Now, suppose the law, making this grant, were to be repealed, there would be, at once, 100,000*l.* to be confided to the King for purposes such as those said to be contemplated by the men of Lloyd's.—Would not this be much better than the setting to work all the magistrates and ministers in the kingdom to collect money to be distributed to the soldiers and sailors by a committee of fund-dealers?—During the last year only about 40,000*l.* a year was granted in pensions and in other ways resembling pensions. In some cases the grant was for life; in others for two lives; and in others for three lives; I believe. These grants cannot be estimated as being worth (were they to be sold) less than 700,000*l.* at the lowest. Now, here is seven times as much as is said to be wanted for the rewarding of the soldiers and sailors; and why could not the granting of pensions (except those of military and naval men and their widows and orphans, which are not included in the 40,000*l.* a year, granted last year) have been suspended for one year? Nay, why may it not be suspended during this present year? We shall, however, see, about May next, that it has not been suspended.—Still, however, let us rest upon the grants of last year. There was granted

to the wife of Sir William Augustus Pitt 600*l.* a year; to Lady Auckland 500*l.* a year; to Mrs. Sargent and her husband, 616*l.* a year; to Lord Auckland an additional pension of 400*l.* a year; to Mr. Isaac Corry, 1,200*l.* a year; to a family of *Dundas* the father, mother and children, 600*l.* a year. These grants would sell for at least 100,000*l.* The nation is pledged for so much on account of them. It must borrow so much in order to be able to pay them.—Well, then, could they not have been dispensed with? Was there any pressing necessity for granting them; and this, too, observe, at a moment when such means are resorted to, when subscriptions are opened, when the charity box is to be carried round the churches for the purpose of obtaining a hundred thousand pounds to reward the merits, or to relieve the distress, of those who have been fighting the battles of their country?—Last year, too, in about ten weeks after Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville came into office, there was granted to Lord Melville, 1,500*l.* a year, in addition to his former 3,000*l.* a year, for his sinecure place of Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland.—Here again is another good 70, or 80 thousand pounds. It would sell for that sum at Lloyd's. And, why could it not have been saved for the purposes now to be provided for by an appeal to the *charity* of the nation? Observe, that it is the *ministerial writers*, who have assumed the necessity of raising the 100,000*l.* for the reward and relief of the soldiers and sailors: it is they, observe, who are reproaching the nobility with apathy and want of patriotism in not making sacrifices, in not coming forward to throw their money into the lap of the Committee at Lloyd's: it is they who have the impudence to talk of an extravagant expenditure, of a ruinous waste of money: it is they who are crying shame upon those who do not contribute towards the recompensing of the valour by which the country is protected: it is they who have thrown down the gauntlet, and toward them let the resentment of their wincing patrons be directed.

BOULOGNE EXPEDITION.—Sir Sid. Smith's return, without making, as it would appear, any attempt, must, I think, be considered as a matter of great consolation, particularly if we may hence collect, that no attempt is, in the way and with the means described by the newspapers, likely to be made in future; for, from such attempts, is it possible for reasonable minds to anticipate any thing but failure and disgrace, a confirmation of the hopes of the enemy, additional discouragement

to our own people, and, what is of most importance of all, the loss of many valuable lives, in return for the destruction of a few vessels hardly worth the expence of the powder.—Now, pray, gentlemen of the ministerial press, do not misunderstand me. I do not say, as you will swear I do, that I *wish the enemy's flotilla not to be destroyed*. Pray do not swear that, gentlemen! But, I am afraid you will.—I wish the flotilla to be destroyed; but, I have not the least notion that it ever will be destroyed by an attack on the sea board, unassisted by an attack on the land board side. To destroy the flotilla, the land batteries, or some of them, at least, must be first silenced; and how, in the name of sense and reason, are they to be silenced but by land operations. Land batteries have been silenced by men of war, and particularly by British men of war; but, those were not such batteries, and so served, as the batteries of Boulogne. Indeed, this seems to be a point, as to which all men agree in opinion. But, some think, that the flotilla may be destroyed, without silencing the batteries, an error, I am afraid, that will yet cost us dear.—Those who think with me, that an attack by land must take place in order to effect the destruction of any considerable part of the hideous flotilla, will, perhaps, regret, that such an attack was not made the moment the French army marched away for the Rhine. Upon this subject a dispute has arisen, in consequence of an article in the Morning Chronicle, complaining that such an attack was not made. The answer of the ministerial paper, the *Courier*, I will here insert, and, first begging the reader to go over it with attention, will then submit to him such observations as occur to me:—
 “When a land expedition is determined upon, then they are violent in their complaints, that a naval one has not been preferred; when a naval expedition is to be carried into execution, then a land one would have been infinitely preferable. In fact, every thing must be wrong that Mr. Pitt does, because Mr. Pitt does it. But *why a land one against Boulogne?* Because; and here it is that we complain most of the Opposition writers. Whenever they want to strengthen an argument or point an invective, they assume certain points as ascertained and proved facts. Two months ago, they assert, the French had only five thousand troops at Boulogne. Where did they learn that fact? How did they ascertain it? How could they have come at the knowledge of the amount of the force at Boulogne? Ge-

“ neral Moore, accompanied by Sir Sidney
 “ Smith, went not long ago on a survey to
 “ the French coast, and, they tell us, gave
 “ it as his opinion, ‘ that the works could
 “ not be attacked with any chance of suc-
 “ cess with less than 30,000 men.’ How
 “ has that fact been ascertained? Has Ge-
 “ neral Moore declared publicly that to be
 “ his opinion? If he has, we should sup-
 “ pose that that would afford pretty strong
 “ reason for believing that there were more
 “ than 5000 men at Boulogne two months
 “ ago. But even now they assert, that the
 “ military force at Boulogne does not greatly
 “ exceed 8000 men. What means have
 “ they had of ascertaining this, and of thus
 “ knowing the exact state and strength of
 “ the enemy at Boulogne for the last two
 “ months? But all these points are given
 “ to us as incontrovertible; we are to take
 “ them as ascertained beyond the possibility
 “ of doubt, in order that they may found
 “ upon them an attack upon ministers for
 “ not having 30,000, or even 40, or 50,000
 “ men ready three months ago, to have
 “ achieved the destruction of Boulogne.—
 “ With regard to the adoption of the plan
 “ of destroying Boulogne, as a means of di-
 “ verting the force and attention of Buona-
 “ parté, we cannot see how it could have
 “ produced that effect; for as it must have
 “ been done by a coup de main, it would
 “ have been done *before Buonaparté could*
 “ *have had time to turn his attention from*
 “ *the operations of the war in Germany and*
 “ *Italy.* But the destruction of Boulogne
 “ is entirely an English object; no attack
 “ could have been made upon the town till
 “ the renewal of war upon the Continent
 “ had forced Buonaparté to remove his troops
 “ from the coast. Now we put it to any
 “ man, whether, professing and meaning to
 “ co-operate with the Continent for restor-
 “ ing the independence of the Continent, it
 “ would have been wise policy, that our
 “ first operation, after the renewal of conti-
 “ nental war, *should have been one in which*
 “ *we alone had any interest or concern?*
 “ Might it not have afforded some counte-
 “ nance to the idea, so industriously propa-
 “ gated by the Opposition for the purpose
 “ of setting the Continent against us, *that*
 “ *we wished to engage the Continent in war*
 “ *for our own selfish and interested purposes?*
 “ Our policy was more liberal and enlarged:
 “ our first measure, after the renewal of
 “ continental war, was to send troops to
 “ co-operate with the Continent. We shew
 “ the Continental Powers, that though the
 “ destruction of Boulogne be a desirable
 “ object to this country, yet as it is desira-
 “ ble only to this country, we prefer, being

“ engaged in a common cause with them,
 “ doing that which tends to assist and pro-
 “ mote that cause. We should have been
 “ sorry, therefore, if General Don had been
 “ sent against Boulogne; and ministers, we
 “ think, pursue a wise policy in dispatching
 “ our disposable troops to the Continent.
 “ And here, when the Opposition are, first,
 “ inveighing against ministers for their in-
 “ activity, and for carrying on a puny, pid-
 “ dling warfare, and next blaming them for
 “ not sending 40, 50, or 60,000 men against
 “ this or that place, does it ever enter into
 “ their contemplation what this *inactive*
 “ government has done? Besides sending
 “ troops to Gibraltar, to the East Indies and
 “ the West, they have sent an expedition,
 “ under General Baird, *against the Cape,*
 “ an expedition, under General Craig, to
 “ the Mediterranean, an expedition to the
 “ Weser, under General Don; a second ex-
 “ pedition is also preparing in the Downs;
 “ and all this has been done, besides fur-
 “ nishing crews for upwards of 100 sail of
 “ the line, without reckoning the frigates
 “ and smaller vessels, and also the crews for
 “ the myriads of *merchant ships*, by which
 “ the commerce of the country is carried on.
 “ The wonder, therefore, is, not that with
 “ *such a population* ministers have done no
 “ more, but that they have done so much.
 “ But it is sufficient that Mr. Pitt adopts
 “ any measure, for the Opposition writers
 “ to cry out against it; and we have already
 “ detected and exposed them in an attempt
 “ to dim the brilliancy of Lord Nelson’s
 “ great victory, and to damp the general
 “ transport it has excited, merely because it
 “ has been achieved under Mr. Pitt’s ad-
 “ ministration.” — It is very much to
 “ be wished, that these writers would leave off
 “ this childish monotonous whine about our
 “ disapproving of measures, metely because
 “ they are Mr. Pitt’s. Our disapprobation is
 “ founded upon *reasons* clearly stated; and
 “ can it be hoped, that any body, capable of
 “ judging between us, will be influenced by a
 “ crying complaint in behalf of the person of
 “ Mr. Pitt? It is a pity they do not leave this
 “ off; for it excites a degree of disgust not to
 “ be compensated for by that rhetorical buf-
 “ foonery, which, in this editor of the *COR-*
 “ *RIER*, for instance, would otherwise be high-
 “ ly entertaining.—“ But, why a land ex-
 “ pedition against Boulogne?” Because the
 “ flotilla is covered by the land batteries; and,
 “ if you wish for another reason, because Lord
 “ Nelson, though he got in amongst the boats
 “ from the sea board, was obliged to abandon
 “ the enterprize with considerable loss. Here
 “ are, I think, reasons why, if *any* expedition
 “ at all be sent against Boulogne, it should, in

part, at least, be a land expedition.—As to the French force at Boulogne, it must, one would think, be easy enough for the ministers to ascertain nearly the amount of it; but, unless they have ascertained, not only that, but also the extent of the power of the enemy to *collect troops* in that quarter, it is certainly prudent in them to forbear to send any troops against Boulogne. But, when we hear the ministerial writers accuse the Opposition of *assuming* that Boulogne was, just after the departure of the French army, destitute of troops, we should, were not an excess of charity checked by reason and experience, conclude that they had completely forgotten the intelligence which they themselves gave us, at the time referred to. They told us, that the whole of the army had marched away; that the flotilla was begun to be *dismantled*; that *considerable progress* had already been made in the work; that the "batteries, which had so annoyed our vessels, were left *half-manned*;" that there was not a soldier to be seen from the coast; and, in short, such a picture was drawn of the situation of Boulogne, as to convince any one, who was weak enough to believe the *MORNING POST* or the *COURIER*, that an attack by land, though with a trifling force, must have been successful. Weak indeed were those who did believe them; but, let us hear no more of our *assuming* that Boulogne was, for a while, at least, left in a defenceless state.—And why, if Boulogne had been attacked by land, might that attack not have diverted the attention of Buonaparté? "It must have been done *suddenly*." Well; but, it could not have been so sudden that he could not have *heard* of it before the whole was over. And, besides, if it had not retarded his progress in the first instance, would it not have retarded him, at last, by delaying the march of his reserve? And, if it had met with little opposition, and had, of course, been successful, must it not have alarmed him for the safety of other parts of his coast? And would this alarm have caused *no diversion*? Would it have prevented the advance of neither Augereau nor any other general? Would it have drawn no troops towards the Channel? Would it, indeed, have done nothing towards preventing the terrible disasters in Suabia?—These questions the reader will have already answered, and, therefore we will come to another argument, which will be found not less curious than the former. The destruction of the flotilla was, we are told, entirely an English object, and, therefore, it would not

have been wise in us to have *begun* our operations there, lest our allies should have suspected, that we had only our own interests in view. Now, you are to observe, that, in the case of the late *naval victory*, which could not *possibly* make any diversion in favour of Austria, or of any of our allies, I have been censured, nay, most grossly reviled, for having given it as my opinion, that it would not greatly tend to revive the spirit of those allies, seeing that it was purely an English object! Yes, said this same writer, it will invigorate our allies, for they will now be convinced *that we are in no fear for ourselves*. But, would they not have been more fully convinced of this, if we had succeeded in destroying the flotilla; that dreadful day-and-night apparition, the flotilla at Boulogne?—Giving the reader sufficient time to bless himself over this palpable, this scandalous saying and unsaying, I must beg his attention to one topic more, the expedition against the CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, which, as our opponent boasts, is now undertaken by General BAIRD, and, probably, seven or eight thousand men. Is this a British object? The Lord Chancellor, Lord Hawkesbury, every one of the present ministers, who belonged to the last ministry, and who spoke upon the peace of Amiens, declared, that the CAPE was a *mere burden*, and that we ought to rejoice at being *happily rid of it*! Mr. Pitt did not go quite so far, certainly; but he approved of the treaty generally, and was far from allowing, that the giving up of the Cape was an object of much importance. Yet, to re-capture this station it is, that a considerable part of our best troops are now sent, and that, too, at a moment when they are so much wanted in Europe, where, say men what they will, the contest *must* be decided. It is in vain to endeavour to disguise this truth from the eyes of the people. It is in vain to delude them with the hopes of final success from the capture of colonies, or even from the destruction of fleets. To this we must finally come, victory upon land in Europe, or a peace more disgraceful than the last.

The question whether Mr. Pitt precipitated Austria into the war shall be discussed in my [next. It is one of great importance; and such the ministers *feel* it to be, as is evident from the means, which their partizans are making use of to rebut the charge.—The intelligence from the Continent must remain unobserved on for the present.

Botley, Thursday, }
Nov. 28. }